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INTRODUCTION 
 
Cities are not subject to suit under the Federal Wiretapping Act 
(FWA) for wrongfully intercepting and disclosing emails between 
citizens. That was what the Seventh Circuit held recently in Seitz v. 
Elgin, Ill.
1
 The decision created a circuit split because the Sixth Circuit 
previously held that the amendments to the FWA did create a cause of 
action for suits against municipalities.
2
  
The amendments to §2520 of the FWA provide a civil cause of 
action against “the person or entity, other than the United States,” who 
intentionally uses another person's electronic communication in 
violation of the act's provisions.
3
 The statute, however, did not always 
read this way. The original 1968 version of the Act provided a cause of 
action only against any “person,”4 but Congress expanded the scope of 
liability in a 1986 amendment to include “person or entity,” and then 
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Chicago Kent College of Law. 
1
 Seitz v. City of Elgin, 719 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2013).  
2
 Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 985 (6th Cir. 2001). 
3
 18 U.S.C.A. § 2520(a) (Westlaw 2013). 
4
 Id. 
1
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to a “person or entity, other than the United States,” under the USA 
PATRIOT Act in 2001.
5
 
The definitions of “person” and “entity” matter because in Seitz, 
the plaintiffs sued the City of Elgin under §2511(1)(c-d) of the FWA, 
which prohibits “any person” from intentionally disclosing or using 
communications intercepted in violation of the FWA.
6
 The Seventh 
Circuit concluded that the definition of “person” did not include 
municipalities.
7
 And because §2520 only created a cause of action for 
violations of the FWA, it follows that §2520 confers a cause of action 
to enforce §2511(1) only against a “person” as defined by the statute.8 
In determining whether someone may vindicate a particular statutory 
right, the Seventh Circuit said courts should look to the scope and 
nature of the specific substantive right at issue,
9
 meaning two things: 
1) the statute confers a right on identifiable persons; and 2) the 
plaintiff is a member of that class of identifiable persons.
10
 Here, 
§2511(1) confers rights on identifiable persons, but it limits those 
plaintiffs to those that were harmed by a “person” as defined in 
§2510(6) of the Act. Thus, the plaintiffs in Seitz are not the intended 
beneficiaries of the statutory right conferred by §2511(1), and they can 
have no cause of action under §2520 because their communications 
were intercepted by the City of Elgin.
11
  
In Adams v. City of Battle Creek, however, the Sixth Circuit held 
that §2520 created a cause of action against municipalities for all 
violations of the FWA.
12
 The court simply determined that 
municipalities were “entities” within the meaning of the statute and 
                                                 
5
 Andrew Ayers, The Police Can Do What? Making Local Governmental Entities 
Pay for Unauthorized Wiretapping, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 651, 656 (2003). 
6
 18 U.S.C.A §2511(1)(c-d) (Westlaw 2013).  
7
 Seitz, 719 F.3d at 655. 
8
 Id. at 658. 
9
 Id. at 657. 
10
 Id. at n.4. 
11
 Id. at n.4. 
12
 Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 985 (6th Cir. 2001). 
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thus held that rights conferred elsewhere in the statute were made 
actionable by §2520, even if those rights provided for protection 
against actions taken only by a “person” and not an “entity” as defined 
by the statute.
13
 
The Seventh Circuit in Seitz agreed that the meaning of “entity” 
included municipalities, but split with the Sixth Circuit on whether the 
amended portion of the statute itself created any substantive rights.
14
  
Who got it right? 
This Comment argues that not only did the majority opinion in 
Seitz correctly analyze the statutory text of the FWA, but it also upheld 
Congress’s recognition that surveillance plays a crucial role in 
reducing crime.
15
 Part I of this Note presents the underlying facts in 
Seitz. Part II discusses the creation of the FWA and its related 
jurisprudence. Part III examines the rationale behind the majority 
opinion and its split with the Sixth Circuit. Part IV then argues the 
majority opinion is correct for three reasons: First, the court was 
prudent to ask whether the amendments created substantive rights 
because not all provisions of statutes create rights that plaintiffs can 
assert against defendants in court. Second, the court properly 
interpreted the federal wiretapping statute by analyzing the text of the 
amendments to the statute and their relation to the statute as a whole. 
Third, the court’s decision supported a policy that balances cities’ need 
to use surveillance as a protective measure and citizens’ right to 
privacy. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
Debra Seitz and Greg Welter are business partners who own a 
property management company called Wasco Investment 
                                                 
13
 Id. at 659. 
14
 Id. 
15
 H.R. 5037, 90th Cong. (1968) (enacted).   
3
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Corporation.
16
 Greg, at the time, was also a police officer with the City 
of Elgin. In order to carry out the company’s day-to-day operations, 
Seitz and Welter created email accounts with Yahoo!
17
 
In 2010, an employee from the City of Elgin approached Seitz 
with emails that she and Greg had exchanged through their Yahoo! 
email accounts.
18
 Tamara, Greg’s ex-wife, and fellow Elgin police 
officer, Robert Beeter, allegedly sent an anonymous letter to Elgin’s 
corporation counsel informing them of Greg’s use of LEADS in 
conjunction with his business.
19
 Tamara and Beeter accessed Greg’s 
email account, read through emails, printed the emails that are at the 
heart of this litigation, and sent an anonymous letter regarding those 
emails to the corporation counsel.
20
 The emails showed that Greg used 
the Law Enforcement Agencies Data System (“LEADS”) in 
conjunction with he and Seitz’s investment business.21 Greg had used 
LEADS to research vehicles that were parked outside the business.
22
 A 
few days later, the Chief of Police approached Greg with the emails 
and notified him that the city would be conducting a misconduct 
investigation regarding Greg’s use of LEADS.23  
 
B. Procedural Background 
 
Seitz and Welter sued Tamara and Beeter under the FWA, the 
Stored Communications Act (SCA), and the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (CFAA).
24
 In addition, plaintiffs sued the city of Elgin 
                                                 
16
 Seitz v. City of Elgin, 719 F.3d 654, 655 (7th Cir. 2013).  
  
17
 Id. 
18
 Id. 
19
 Id. 
20
 Id. 
21
 Id. 
22
 Id. 
23
 Id. 
24
 Id. 
4
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under the FWA.
25
 The complaint against the city was dismissed.
26
 The 
court issued a minute order indicating that its decision concerning 
municipal liability in a prior case, Abbott v. Village of Winthrop 
Harbor, controlled:
27
 In that case, §2520 authorized no cause of action 
against municipalities because it did not alter the scope of §2511(1) by 
expanding it beyond “persons” as defined in §2510(6) of the FWA.28  
 The Seitz court confirmed the validity of Abbott and held that the 
1986 amendments permit suit against government units through the 
addition of the word “entity” to the statutory text only through 
substantive provisions that identify an entity as a potential violator of 
that provision. 
 
II. THE LAW: BIRTH OF THE FWA AND RELATED SUPREME COURT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
 
A. The Old FWA 
 
The origins of the FWA can be traced back to early American law. 
At common law, eavesdropping was a crime.
29
 However, the crime 
                                                 
25
 Id. 
26
 Id. 
27
 Seitz et al v. Beeter et al, Docket No. 1:11-cv-04803 (N.D. Ill. Jul 15, 2011), 
Court Docket # 100. 
28
 Abbott v. Village of Winthrop Harbor, 205 F. 3d 976, 980 (7th Cir. 2000). In 
Abbott, the village of Winthrop Harbor decided to overhaul the emergency telephone 
system in 1991. The new telephone lines were hooked up to a recording device, with 
the exception of one line that was used by employees to make personal phone calls. 
In 1992, the police chief instructed an independent contractor to hook a recording 
device to the personal calls line, and not to tell anyone about the connection. 
Recordings took place for three months before the recording device was discovered. 
The phone line continued to be tapped until 1993 when the police chief learned of a 
lawsuit against the county for tapping the line without notice. 
29
 “Eavesdroppers, or such as listen under walls or windows, or the eaves of a 
house, to hearken after discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous and 
mischievous tales, are a common nuisance and presentable at the court-leet; or are 
indictable at the sessions, and punishable by fine and finding of sureties for [their] 
5
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was seldom prosecuted,
30
 and by the end of the nineteenth century the 
crime had essentially vanished.
31
 But with the invention of the 
telegraph and telephone, states began enacting laws proscribing 
wiretapping, thereby preserving the common law crime of 
eavesdropping.
32
 Congress then enacted the first federal wiretapping 
statute in World War I.
33
 The statute was enacted in response to a 
national discovery that New York City police had been tapping 
telephone wires since the 1890’s.34 At first, the police denied using 
wiretaps, but then they proffered that they used wiretapping because 
they did not believe that the state statute prohibiting use of 
unauthorized wiretapping applied to them.
35
 While the first federal 
wiretap statute was intended to protect the leaking of government 
secrets during World War I,
36
 the federal government found the statute 
                                                                                                                   
good behavior.” 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 169 
(1769). 
30
 GINA STEVES & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PRIVACY: AN 
OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL STATUTES GOVERNING WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC 
EAVESROPPING  2 (2012).  
31
 Id. at n.3 (quoting 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW, 670 
(1882): “Eavesdropping is indictable at the common law, not only in England but in 
our states. It is seldom brought to the attention of the courts, and our books contain 
too few decisions upon it to enable an author to define it with confidence.... It never 
occupied much space in the law, and it has nearly faded from the legal horizon.”). 
32
 Id. at 2. 
33
 Id. at n.4 (citing 40 Stat.1017-18 (1918) “whoever during the period of 
governmental operation of the telephone and telegraph systems of the United States 
... shall, without authority and without the knowledge and consent of the other users 
thereof, except as may be necessary for operation of the service, tap any telegraph or 
telephone line ... or whoever being employed in any such telephone or telegraph 
service shall divulge the contents of any such telephone or telegraph message to any 
person not duly authorized or entitled the receive the same, shall be fined not 
exceeding $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year or both.”); 56 CONG. 
REC. 10761-765 (1918). 
34
 Ayers, supra note 5, at 658. 
35
 Id. 
36
 STEVES & DOYLE, supra note 30, at 2. Congress also proscribed intercepting 
and intentionally disclosing or using private radio communications. The act provides 
that (“ ... no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any message 
6
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increasingly useful in apprehending bootleggers during the prohibition 
era.
37
 Wiretaps became so prevalent that the Supreme Court decided to 
step in and issued a landmark decision in Olmstead v. United States.
38
    
In Olmstead, four federal prohibition officers gathered evidence 
for months against a gang selling liquor on the black market.
39
 The 
scheme was elaborate, consisting of two steamboats to take liquor to 
Canada, several smaller tugboats to transport liquor to places along 
Pujet Sound near Seattle, WA, bookkeepers, salesmen, accountants, 
runners, and an attorney.
40
 The operation also included an office with 
operators.
41
 There were three telephones with three different telephone 
lines available from the main office.
42
  
The leading conspirator, and the general manager of the business, 
was a man named Olmstead.
43
 Olmstead had a telephone in his home, 
as did his associates. These phones, along with others in the city, were 
used to schedule pick up and delivery times for the liquor.
44
 One man 
always remained in the main office to take orders from customers, 
who were secretly given the call number.
45
 Sometimes, 200 orders for 
the sales of liquor were placed per day.
46
  
It was from this office, back and forth between Olmstead and his 
associates, that the federal officers planted wire-listening devices on 
the telephone wires.
47
 The police made the insertions without 
trespassing on the defendants’ property: the taps for the building were 
                                                                                                                   
and divulge or publish the contents, substance, purpose, effect, or meaning of such 
intercepted message to any person ... ”). 44 STAT. 1172 (1927). 
37
 Ayers, supra note 5, at 658. 
38
 Id. 
39
 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 455-56 (1928). 
40
 Id.  
41
 Id. at 456. 
42
 Id. 
43
 Id. 
44
 Id.  
45
 Id.  
46
 Id.  
47
 Id.  
7
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made in the basement, the tap for the residences in the streets 
outside.
48
  
The conversations heard over these wires, testified to by 
government witnesses, demonstrated/helped prove the conspiracy 
charged in the indictment.
49
 Olmstead sued the federal government, 
claiming that the conversations obtained between him and the other 
defendants via wiretapping violated the Fifth and Fourth 
Amendments.
50
  
The court held that there was no Fourth Amendment violation 
because there was no search or seizure.
51
 In addition, the police did not 
enter the houses or offices of the defendants.
52
 The court pointed out 
that, even if wires were a part of the houses, which they were not, the 
police did not intercept defendants’ conversions from within their 
homes.
53
 Thus, there was no fourth amendment violation and the 
evidence obtained from wiretapping was admissible.
54
  
In what has become a famous dissent,
55
 Justice Brandeis noted 
that new ways of invading peoples’ privacy had developed, including 
                                                 
48
 Id. at 457. 
49
 Id. 
50
 Id. at 455. The Fourth Amendment provides: The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. And the Fifth: No person… shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. U.S. Const. Amend 
IV; U.S. Const. Amend. V. 
51
 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466. The court held that Olmstead’s Fourth 
Amendment rights were not violated because there was no “official search and 
seizure of his person or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects or 
an actual physical invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of making a 
seizure.” 
52
 Id. 
53
 Id. at 464-65.  
54
 Id. at 464.  
55
 “The evil incident to invasion of the privacy of the telephone is far greater 
than that involved in tampering with the mails. Whenever a telephone line is tapped, 
the privacy of the persons at both ends of the line is invaded, and all conversations 
8
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invasions beyond an individual’s notice.56 Thus, Justice Brandeis 
proposed that the court adopt a broad view when analyzing a Fourth 
Amendment violation.
57
 Specifically, Justice Brandeis argued that it 
does not matter where the telephone wire interception occurred.
58
 In 
this case, he said, an unlawful violation of defendants’ Fourth 
Amendment rights had occurred because the officers has listened to 
defendants’ telephone conversations without a warrant, with the 
purpose of using those conversations against defendants in court.
59
  
Wiretapping constituted search and seizure, and the police officers 
could no more listen in to defendants’ telephone conversations without 
a warrant than they could seize defendants’ personal papers, for both 
actions involve an intrusion on defendants’ privacy.60  
The Supreme Court next confronted the admissibility of evidence 
obtained through wiretapping in Nardone v. United States
61
 in 1937. 
By way of legal background, Congress had just passed the Federal 
Communications Act (FCA) in 1934.
62
 Thus, Congress had done as 
                                                                                                                   
between them upon any subject, and although proper, confidential and privileged, 
may be overheard. Moreover, the tapping of one man's telephone line involves the 
tapping of the telephone of every other person whom he may call, or who may call 
him. As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny 
instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wire-tapping.” Id. at 
475-76. 
56
 Id. at 475-76. Brandeis compared the federal mail system to telephone 
service: both are services provided by the government, and can thus be abused in the 
same way.  
57
 Ayers, supra note 5, at 661. 
58
 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478. Justice Brandeis used an analogy to demonstrate 
that physical intervention need not be present for a violation of Fourth Amendment 
rights: if an officer unlawfully reads the contents of someone’s information on a 
piece of paper, the officer has not physically seized the paper, but may still be acting 
in violation of Fourth Amendment protections.  
59
 Id. at 478-79. 
60
 See id. at 475-76. 
61
 Nardone v. U.S., 302 U.S. 379, 380 (1979). 
62
 STEVES & DOYLE, supra note 30, at 2. 47 U.S.C.A. §605 provides: “No 
person receiving, assisting in receiving, transmitting, or assisting in transmitting, any 
interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio shall divulge or publish the 
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning thereof, except through 
9
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Justice Taft said in Olmstead that it was free to do: provide protection 
against wiretapping where the Constitution did not.
63
 However, the 
FCA did not protect against the use of machines to record and transmit 
face-to-face conversations.
64
 In the absence of such a statutory 
provision, cases challenging the use of such recording devises surged 
and began to erode the rationale in Olmstead, albeit slowly.
65
 
In Nardone, the petitioners were convicted in the lower court for 
conspiracy to smuggle and possess alcohol.
66
 Like the police in 
Olmstead, the police in Nardone tapped petitioners’ telephone wires 
                                                                                                                   
authorized channels of transmission or reception, to any person other than the 
addressee, his agent, or attorney, to a person employed or authorized to forward such 
communication to its destination, to proper accounting or distributing officers of the 
various communicating centers over which the communication may be passed, to the 
master of a ship under whom he is serving, in response to a subpoena issued by a 
court of competent jurisdiction, or on demand of other lawful authority. No person 
not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or 
publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such 
intercepted communication to any person. No person not being entitled thereto shall 
receive or assist in receiving any interstate or foreign communication by wire or 
radio and use such communication (or any information therein contained) for his 
own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto. No person having 
received any intercepted communication or having become acquainted with the 
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such communication (or any part 
thereof) knowing that such communication was so obtained, shall divulge or publish 
the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such 
communication (or any part thereof) or use such communication (or any information 
therein contained) for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled 
thereto. This section shall not apply to the receiving, divulging, publishing, or 
utilizing the contents of any radio communication which is transmitted by any 
station for the use of the general public, which relates to ships in distress, or which is 
transmitted by an amateur radio station operator or by a citizens band radio 
operator.” 47 U.S.C.A. § 605 (Westlaw 2013). 
63
 Judge Taft wrote: “Congress may of course protect the secrecy of telephone 
messages by making them, when intercepted inadmissible in evidence in federal 
criminal trials, by direct legislation.” Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465. 
64
 STEVES & DOYLE, supra note 30, at 3. 
65
 Id.  
66
 Nardone, 302 U.S. at 380. 
10
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and testified to the information thus obtained in court at trial.
67
 The 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions,
68
 and the petitioners 
sought certiorari.
69
 Arguing for a plain meaning interpretation of the 
statute, the government maintained that federal agents should not fall 
under the term “person” under § 605.121.70 However, the court found 
the opposite: at face value, ‘no person’ included federal agents.71 Thus, 
the Supreme Court held that the information was inadmissible because 
it was obtained from illegal wiretapping.
72
 The case was reversed and 
remanded to the district court.
73
 
The 1940’s witnessed a lack of enforcement of wiretapping laws, 
and thus the practice of wiretapping enjoyed resurgence.
74
 World War 
II precipitated the need for soldiers to intercept messages during 
wartime, at home and abroad.
75
 Thus, a Department of Treasury officer 
estimated that he installed over 10,000 wiretaps on American soil in 
one decade.
76
 During this time, the Supreme Court adjudicated a case 
where the petitioner claimed a violation of the FCA in Goldman v. 
United States.
77
 In this case, two federal offices tapped the telephone 
wires of petitioner to listen and record conversations within his 
office.
78
 Petitioner claimed that the evidence obtained from 
wiretapping could not be admissible at trial.
79
 The court held that the 
wiretapping was not a violation of the FCA because it did not meet the 
requirements of the statute, which provide that a communication and 
                                                 
67
 See id. 
68
 Nardone v. U.S., 90 F. 2d 630, 632 (2nd Cir. 1937). 
69
 Nardone, 302 U.S. at 380. 
70
 Id. at 383. 
71
 Id. at 381. 
72
 Id. at 383. 
73
 Id. at 385. 
74
 SAMUEL DASH ET AL., THE EAVESDROPPERS 30 (1959). 
75
 Id. 
76
 Ayers, supra note 5, at 664. 
77
 316 U.S. 129, 132 (1942). 
78
 Id. at 130. 
79
 Id. at 132. 
11
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interception must occur.
80
 The court argued that there was no 
communication because the federal agents only heard half of the 
petitioner’s conversations.81 Second, there was no interception, 
because the agents did not actually intercept the communication, rather 
they heard the conversations spoken into the telephone receiver.
82
  
At the pinnacle of judicial leeway for wiretapping, and a good 
example of the freedom courts had to allow wiretapping due to lack of 
statutory provision regarding recording devices,
83
 is Irvine v. United 
States.
84
 In that case, police were suspicious of illegal bookkeeping 
and so planted a concealed microphone in defendant’s hallway.85 The 
microphone picked up sounds that were sent to a nearby garage where 
officers could listen.
86
 The officers subsequently moved the 
microphone from the hallway to the bedroom, then from the bedroom 
to the closet.
87
 The officers gained access to defendant’s home by 
having a locksmith go to the home and make a key.
88
 Citing to Wolf v. 
Colorado,
89
 the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
prevent evidence obtained through unlawful search and seizure from 
being presented in court.
90
  
The application of wiretapping law saw a turn with Silverman v. 
United States.
91
 In 1958, the owner of an empty house in Washington, 
                                                 
80
 Id. at 133. 
81
 Id. 
82
 Id.  The Court used this analogy to illustrate its point: the words that a 
person writes down to be transmitted by telegraph are not protected by the FCA until 
those words are transmitted by the telegraph company over wires. So too here, the 
words spoken into a telephone receiver are not protected by the FCA until they are 
transmitted over the telephone wire.  
83
 STEVES & DOYLE, supra note 30, at 3. 
84
 347 U.S. 128, 130-31 (1954). 
85
 Id. at 130-31. 
86
 Id. at 131. 
87
 Id. 
88
 Id. at 130-31. 
89
 338 U.S. 25 (1949).  
90
 Irvine, 347 U.S. at 133-33, 136-37. 
91
 365 U.S. 505 (1961). 
12
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D.C. allowed local officials to use the house as an observation house 
to help determine whether petitioner was using his premises for illicit 
gambling activity.
92
 The police used a “spike mike” to listen in on 
petitioner’s conversations.93 The Court of Appeals held that, like the 
court in Goldman, there was no violation of the FCA because there 
was neither a communication nor an interception.
94
 The petitioner 
asked that the court reconsider its holding in Olmstead and Goldman 
because now, new technologies were available to law enforcement 
officials, thereby changing the scope of municipal liability because of 
the possibility of invasions of privacy not previously contemplated by 
the legislature.
95
 The Supreme Court did not reconsider Olmstead or 
Goldman, but it did distinguish them.
96
 Whereas those cases involved 
an unknown intrusion into petitioner’s privacy via wiretapping, 
Silverman involved a complete trespass of petitioner’s property.97 
This, the Court held, was a flagrant violation of petitioner’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.
98
  
Berger v. New York
99
 paved the way for a codification of Fourth 
Amendment rights regarding wiretaps.
100
 Berger itself challenged the 
constitutionality of a 1938 amendment to the New York state 
constitution
101
 to allow wiretapping.
102
 In this case, Berger was 
                                                 
92
 Id. at 506. 
93
 Id. 
94
 Id. at 507-508. 
95
 Id. at 508-509. 
96
 Id. at 509-11. 
97
 Id. at 511- 512. 
98
 Id. 
99
 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
100
 Ayers, supra note 5, at 672. 
101
 Berger, 388 U.S. at n.1(“An ex parte order for eavesdropping as defined in 
subdivisions one and two of section seven hundred thirty-eight of the penal law may 
be issued by any justice of the supreme court or judge of a county court or of the 
court of general sessions of the county of New York upon oath or affirmation of a 
district attorney, or of the attorney-general or of an officer above the rank of sergeant 
of any police department of the state or of any political subdivision thereof, that 
there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may be thus obtained, 
13
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convicted of bribing the Chairman of the New York State Liquor 
Authority.
103
 The State Supreme Court authorized the placing of 
recording devices in two of Berger’s offices.104 The Court found that 
the statute was unconstitutional
105
 for four reasons: 1) the statute 
lacked particularity required by the Fourth Amendment; 2) under the 
statute, searches were allowed to go on for two months without any 
probable cause; 3) Once the communication was seized, the statute 
outlined no termination period for eavesdropping; and 4) there was no 
requirement notice.
106
 The Court concluded, in essence, that the statute 
unconstitutionally permitted an invasion of home or office without 
warrant, contrary to the protections guaranteed under the Fourth 
Amendment.
107
  
Finally, in 1967, the Supreme Court issued its final statement on 
wiretapping prior to the new federal wiretapping statute.
108
 In Katz v. 
                                                                                                                   
and particularly describing the person or persons whose communications, 
conversations or discussions are to be overheard or recorded and the purpose thereof, 
and, in the case of a telegraphic or telephonic communication, identifying the 
particular telephone number or telegraph line involved. In connection with the 
issuance of such an order the justice or judge may examine on oath the applicant and 
any other witness he may produce and shall satisfy himself of the existence of 
reasonable grounds for the granting of such application. Any such order shall be 
effective for the time specified therein but not for a period of more than two months 
unless extended or renewed by the justice or judge who signed and issued the 
original order upon satisfying himself that such extension or renewal is in the public 
interest. Any such order together with the papers upon which the application was 
based, shall be delivered to and retained by the applicant as authority for the 
eavesdropping authorized therein. A true copy of such order shall at all times be 
retained in his possession by the judge or justice issuing the same, and, in the event 
of the denial of an application for such an order, a true copy of the papers upon 
which the application was based shall in like manner be retained by the judge or 
justice denying the same. As amended L.1958, c. 676, eff. July 1, 1958.” ). 
102
 Id. at 43. 
103
 Id. at 44. 
104
 Id. at 45. 
105
 Id. at 64. 
106
 Id. at 58-60. 
107
 Id. 
108
 Ayers, supra note 5, at 672. 
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United States, the petitioner was convicted of transmitting wagering 
information over the telephone from California to Miami and 
Boston.
109
 The police attached an electronic listening devise to a 
public telephone where petitioner made phone calls.
110
 The Ninth 
Circuit rejected petitioner’s argument that his Fourth Amendment 
rights were violated via this process because the electronic listening 
device did not actually enter the telephone booth in order to record 
petitioner’s conversations.111 On appeal, the government reiterated its 
argument in front of the Supreme Court that petitioner could not have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy because the telephone booth was 
made of glass, so petitioner could not expect to be shielded upon 
entering the booth to conduct his conversations.
112
 The Court rejected 
this argument, arguing that when petitioner entered the telephone 
booth, he could close the door behind him, indicating that he could 
reasonably expect to have private telephone conversations.
113
 Justice 
Harlan’s concurrence adopted a new two-part test114 to determine 
when an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.
115
 
Ultimately, the Court’s holding that the procedure used by the FBI was 
unconstitutional turned on the fact that they did not obtain the proper 
warrant to conduct their search.
116
 
The Court’s decision in Katz came full circle to Justice Brandeis’ 
dissent in Olmstead. Justice Brandeis disagreed with the majority that 
the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unlawful search and 
seizure did not include telephone conversations.
117
 When the Fourth 
                                                 
109
 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967). 
110
 Id. 
111
 Id. 
112
 Id. at 351-52. 
113
 Id. at 352. 
114
 Id. at 361 (“My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior 
decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one 
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).  
115
 Id.  
116
 Id. at 359. 
117
 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928). 
15
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Amendment was adopted, Brandeis notes, force and violence were the 
only means the government had of effecting self-incrimination.
118
 
Now, however, subtler ways of invading individuals’ privacy have 
become available to the government, like wiretapping.
119
 Therefore, 
courts should extend Fourth Amendment protection to searches and 
seizures that relate to “the most intimate occurrences in the home,”120 
whether that be what is written on personal papers or spoken to others 
via new communication devices.
121
 The Court in Katz agreed, holding 
that intrusions to privacy need not be physical in order to offend the 
Fourth Amendment.
122
 The Court said:  
 
We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and 
Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions 
that the trespass doctrine there enunciated can no longer be 
regarded as controlling. The Government’s activities in 
electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s 
words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied 
while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a search 
and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that 
end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth could 
have no constitutional significance.
123
 
                                                 
118
 Id.  
119
 Id. at 473-74. Justice Brandeis said that the government will continue to 
obtain ways spy on private citizens that go beyond wiretapping. “The progress of 
science in furnishing the government with means of espionage is not likely to stop 
with wire tapping. Ways may some day be developed by which the government, 
without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by 
which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the 
home. Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of 
individual security?” 
120
 Id. at 474. 
121
 Id. at 477. 
122
 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
 
123
 Id. 
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After Katz, Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act, otherwise known as the Wiretap Act.
124
 
 
B. The New FWA 
 
The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, otherwise 
known as the Wiretap Act, was a comprehensive wiretapping and 
electronic eavesdropping statute.
125
 The Act outlawed both activities 
generally, but also addressed the concerns of the court in Berger by 
permitting federal and state law enforcement officers to use 
wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping devices under limited 
conditions.
126
 Then, in 1986, Congress enacted the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), which did three things: 1) 
revised the FWA; 2) created the Stored Commination’s Act; and 3) 
added provisions governing the use of pen registers and trap and trace 
devices.
127
 
The 1986 amendments to the federal wiretapping statute added the 
word “entity” to §2520(a) of the FWA.128 The legislature was silent as 
to why they added the word “entity” to the statute. As a result, the 
uncertainty as to whether “person or entity” included municipalities 
paved the way for a circuit split between the Sixth Circuit and the 
Seventh Circuit.
129
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
124
 JUSTICE INFORMATION SHARING WEBSITE, 
https://it.ojp.gov/default.aspx?area=privacy&page=1284 (last visited Dec. 12, 2013). 
125
 STEVES & DOYLE, supra note 30, at 5. 
126
 Id. 
127
 Id.at 6. 
128
 Seitz v. City of Elgin, 719 F.3d 654, 656 (7th Cir. 2013).  
129
 See generally id.; see Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 980 
(6th Cir. 2001). 
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C. The Circuit Split 
 
Amati v. City of Woodstock was the first case to consider whether 
municipalities were liable under the FWA since the 1986 amendments 
to the FWA statute.
130
 In Amati, several Woodstock policeman brought 
suit against the City of Woodstock and the Chief of Police, as well as 
another police officer, for intercepting calls on a telephone line 
reserved for private calls at the police department.
131
 The telephone 
system maintained for the transmission of telephone communications 
to and from the police department had, at least since 1982, kept one 
telephone wire untapped for the private communications of department 
personnel.
132
 In December of 1982, the police department circulated a 
memorandum indicating that line 338-7799 was intentionally left 
untapped for personal phone calls.
133
 In June of 1991, the Chief of 
Police sought and received authorization to intercept the private 
line.
134
 Personal were never notified, and the practice continued until 
1992.
135
 At that time, the Chief of Police told another police officer, 
one plaintiff, that the department had been intercepting calls on the 
private line since 1991.
136
 That was the first notice plaintiffs received 
that the policy set forth in the 1982 memorandum was no longer 
effective.
137
 
The Plaintiffs argued that the addition of the word “entity” to 
§2520 of the FWA authorized recovery of civil damages against 
governmental units.
138
 But in order to determine whether the police 
could prevail against the city for violating the wiretapping statute, the 
                                                 
130
 Brief of the Defendant-Appellee City of Elgin, Seitz v. City of Elgin, 719 
F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013), at 24. 
131
 Amati v. City of Woodstock, 829 F. Supp. 998, 1000-01 (N.D. Ill. 1993). 
132
 Id. 
133
 Id. at 1001. 
134
 Id. 
135
 Id. 
136
 Id. 
137
 Id. 
138
 Id. at 1002. 
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court looked to a congressional comment concerning the definition of 
“person” and found that Congress was clear about excluding 
governmental units from its definition.
139
 The court concluded that the 
legislative history of the 1986 amendments clearly did not support suit 
against government entities simply by adding the word “entity” to 
§2520 of the statute.
140
  
Then, in Abbott v. Village of Winthrop Harbor, the court held 
again that §2520 authorized no cause of action against municipalities 
because it did not alter the scope of §2511(1) by expanding it beyond 
“persons” as defined in §2510(6) of the FWA.141 In Abbott, the village 
of Winthrop Harbor decided to overhaul the emergency telephone 
system in 1991.
142
 The new telephone lines were hooked up to a 
recording device, with the exception of one line that was used by 
employees to make personal phone calls.
143
 In 1992, the police chief 
instructed an independent contractor to hook a recording device to the 
personal calls line, and not to tell anyone about the connection.
144
 
Recordings took place for three months before the recording device 
was discovered.
145
 The phone line continued to be tapped until 1993 
when the police chief learned of a lawsuit against the county for 
tapping the line without notice.
146
 The court rejected plaintiff’s 
argument that adding the word “entity” to §2520 evinced 
congressional intent to subject cities to suit under the statute.
147
 
Rather, the court was persuaded by the fact that Congress did not 
modify the definition of the word “person” in §2510(6), which 
expressly excludes governmental entities.
148
 
                                                 
139
 Id.   
140
 Id. at 1003. 
141
 Abbott v. Village of Winthrop Harbor, 205 F.3d 976, 980 (7th Cir. 2000).  
142
 Id. at 978. 
143
 Id. 
144
 Id. at 979. 
145
 Id. 
146
 Id. 
147
 Id. at 980. 
148
 Id. 
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 The only other Circuit to decide whether municipalities are 
subject to suit under the FWA was the Sixth Circuit in Adams v. City of 
Battle Creek.
149
 In that case, The City of Battle Creek Police 
Department tapped a police officer’s pager because they believed he 
was assisting drug dealers.
150
 The police department had no warrant 
for tapping the officer’s pager and did not give him notice.151 The 
Sixth Circuit argued that the proper approach to determining liability 
for municipalities under the FWA was to look at the legislative 
history.
152
 The Court said: “The provision of the Act providing for 
civil liability, § 2520, was amended in 1986 and made part of the 1986 
Privacy Act. The amendment added the words "or entity" to those who 
may be held liable under the Act. The addition of the words "entity" 
can only mean a governmental entity because prior to the 1986 
amendments, the definition of "person" already included business 
entities. In order for the term not to be superfluous, the term "entity" 
necessarily means governmental entities.”153 Then, the court drew 
support from the legislative history of the Stored Communications 
Act,
154
 which expressly included government entities in the definition 
of “entity.”155 Based on the 1986 amendments and their legislative 
history, the court held that government entities are liable under 
§2520.
156
 
 The Seventh Circuit in Seitz agreed that the meaning of “entity” 
included municipalities, but split with the Sixth Circuit on whether the 
amended portion of the statute itself created any substantive rights.
157
 
 
                                                 
149
 Brief of the Defendant-Appellee City of Elgin, Seitz v. City of Elgin, 719 
F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013), at 26. 
150
 Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 982 (6th Cir. 2001). 
151
 Id. 
152
 Id. at 985. 
153
 Id. 
154
 18 U.S.C. §2707(a). 
155
 Adams, 250 F. 3d at 985. 
156
 Id. 
157
 Seitz v. City of Elgin, 719 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2013).  
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D. The Seitz Rationale 
 
Seitz and Welter sued Tamara and Beeter under the FWA, the 
Stored Communications Act (SCA), and the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (CFAA).
158
  Plaintiffs also sued the city of Elgin under the 
FWA.
159
 Judge Lefkow dismissed the complaint against the city.
160
 
The court held that cities could not be liable under  §2511(c-d) of the 
FWA.
161
  
On appeal, a three-member panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed 
Judge Lefkow’s decision, finding that “ § 2520 itself creates no 
substantive rights. Rather, it simply provides a cause of action to 
vindicate rights identified in other portions of the FWA, specifically 
communications “intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in 
violation of this chapter.”162  Plaintiffs accused the City of violating § 
2511(1)(c-d), which prohibits only “any person” from intentionally 
disclosing or using communications intercepted in violation of the 
FWA. The definition of “person,” the court stated, does not include 
municipalities.
163
 Therefore, § 2511(1)(c-d) is not made actionable by 
§ 2520.
164
 
Notably, the majority found not only that “nothing in the 1986 
amendments altered the scope of the violation by expanding it beyond 
“persons” as defined by the FWA,”165 but it also went on to say that 
this reading of the statute would give meaning to each word of the 
statute “only if the FWA somewhere else creates a substantive right 
against an entity.”166 On this point, the court found that §2511(3)(a) 
                                                 
158
 Id. at 655. 
159
 Id. 
160
 Id. 
161
 Id. 
162
 Id. at 657. 
163
 Id. at 658. 
164
 Id. at 657. 
165
 Id. 
166
 Id. 
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was added by the same 1986 law that wrote “or entity” into §2520.167 
§2511(3)(a) prohibits “a person or entity providing an electronic 
communication service to the public shall not intentionally divulge the 
contents of any communication (other than one to such person or 
entity, or an agent thereof) while in transmission on that service to any 
person or entity other than an addressee or intended recipient of such 
communication or an agent of such addressee or intended recipient.”168 
Thus, §2511(3)(a) creates enforceable rights against an entity, and, if 
Congress had not altered §2520 to add the words “or entity,” plaintiffs 
could enforce their rights against a “person” in violation of 
§2511(3)(a) but not an entity, even though §2511(3) includes both.
169
 
The court’s decision avoids this pitfall.170 
As to the court’s approach to determining whether §2520 creates 
an enforceable right against municipalities in Adams, the majority 
began by asserting that the court did not consider whether §2520 
created any substantive rights and did not consider whether other 
provisions of the statute provided a civil cause of action against an 
entity.
171
 The Adams court concluded that governmental units were 
“entities” under §2520 and found that therefore §2520 brought 
municipalities within the scope of liability.
172
 Writing for the majority 
in Seitz, Judge Flaum said that to reach its decision in Adams, the 
Sixth Circuit inappropriately relied on the legislative history of a 
closely related act: the SCA.
173
 Judge Flaum described how the 
legislature created §2707(a)
174
 of the SCA when it amended §2520 of 
the FWA.
175
 The Senate Committee Report summarizing §2707 states 
                                                 
167
 Id. 
168
 18 U.S.C.A. §2511(3)(a). 
169
 Seitz, 719 F.3d at 658-59. 
170
 Id. at 660. 
171
 Id. at 659.  
172
 Id. 
173
 Id.  
174
 18 U.S.C.A. §2707(a). 
175
 Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 985 (6th Cir. 2001).  
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that the word entity includes governmental units.
176
 However, the 
Seventh Circuit said, this is where the Court in Adams ends its analysis 
of the legislative history of the SCA to give meaning to the word 
entity.
177
 Noting that the same law that created §2520 created the SCA, 
§2707 uses the same “person or entity” language found in §2520.178 
But §2707, like §2520, does not create any substantive rights.
179
 
Unlike §2511(1) of the FWA, which specifies the word “person,” the 
relevant provision of the SCA speaks in much broader terms:  
 
[W]hoever--(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a 
facility through which an electronic communication service is 
provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to 
access that facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents 
authorized access to a wire or electronic communication 
while it is in electronic storage in such system shall be 
punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
180
  
 
Thus, the SCA is written in language that includes persons, 
entities, business, and governmental units within the scope of liability. 
The legislative history of the SCA, then, does not truly parallel the 
FWA,
181
 because the broad use of the term “whoever” does not 
provide guidance for determining the scope of the word “person” 
under §2511(1) of the FWA.
182
 
The majority in Seitz agreed with the Sixth Circuit in that 
“entities” included government units. In a footnote in the opinion, the 
court notes:  
                                                 
176
 Id.  
177
 Seitz, 719 F.3d at 659-60. 
178
 Id. The court notes that Patriot Act later amended §2707, like it did §2520, 
to exclude the United States, and that a Senate Report makes clear that “entity” 
includes government units. 
179
 Id. at 659. 
180
 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. 2701(a)). 
181
 Id. at 659-660. 
182
 Id. at 660. 
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Plaintiffs argue for the first time in their reply brief that the 
City is vicariously liable even under the original definition of 
person. Because that definition includes “any employee, or 
agent of ... any State or political subdivision” and because a 
municipality may only act through its employees or agents, 
plaintiffs argue an employee's or agent's violation of the FWA 
renders the municipality vicariously liable. First, plaintiffs 
have waived this argument by raising it only in their reply 
brief. See Bracey v. Grondlin, 712 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2013). 
Second, plaintiffs offer no argument or authority establishing 
municipalities as “political subdivisions” of the state under 
the FWA (a question we leave open in this opinion). But even 
assuming no such deficiencies, this argument nevertheless 
falls short. Monell v. Department of Social Services declined 
to impose vicarious liability on municipalities under § 1983 
when neither the text nor the legislative history of the statute 
offered any support for doing so. 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 
2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). So too here. The statutory text 
and the legislative history from the original 1968 enactment 
of the FWA both underscore that §2520 did not impose 
liability on “governmental units,” either directly or under a 
theory of vicarious liability.
183
 
 
Additionally, the court noted that if Congress wanted plaintiffs to 
be able to sue municipalities under the FWA, it would have been 
clearer.
184
 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Seitz is correct for three reasons: 
First, the court asked whether the amendments created substantive 
rights, meaning did the amendments provide for a cause of action as 
                                                 
183
 Id. at n.3. 
184
 Id. at 660. 
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opposed to expanding liability as a means of vindicating rights stated 
elsewhere in the act. The question is important because not all 
provisions of statutes create rights that plaintiffs can assert against 
defendants in court. Second, the court properly interpreted the federal 
wiretapping statute by analyzing the text of the amendments to the 
statute and their relation to the statute as a whole. Third, the court’s 
decision supported a policy that balances cities’ need to use 
surveillance as a protective measure and citizens’ right to privacy. 
 
A. Substantive Rights 
 
The majority opinion properly interpreted the FWA on the 
question of municipal liability. It did so by asking a simple but crucial 
question: do the 1986 amendments to the statute allow plaintiffs to 
assert a legal right? To answer this question, the majority first tackled 
the statute’s amendments at issue in the litigation, which provide: “(a) 
In General — Except as provided in section 2511(2)(a)(ii), any person 
whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, 
disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a 
civil action recover from the person or entity, other than the United 
States, which engaged in that violation such relief as may be 
appropriate.”185  
However, the court also looked to a provision elsewhere in the 
statute, which addresses liability for municipalities, and concluded that 
this provision indicates that §2520 does not itself create a right to sue 
municipalities.
186
 § 2511(3)(a) provides: “Except as provided in 
paragraph (b) of this subsection, a person or entity providing an 
electronic communication service to the public shall not intentionally 
divulge the contents of any communication (other than one to such 
person or entity, or an agent thereof) while in transmission on that 
service to any person or entity other than an addressee or intended 
                                                 
185
 18 U.S.C. §2520(a). 
186
 Seitz, 719 F.3d at 658. 
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recipient of such communication or an agent of such addressee or 
intended recipient.”187 
The majority’s review of §2520 and §2511(3)(a) was necessary 
because without first making a determination of whether a specific 
provision confers substantive rights, the court risked bestowing a right 
upon an unintended beneficiary. Aside from the obvious textual 
difference that, unlike § 2520, § 2511(1)(c-d) refers only to actions 
taken by a “person,” the amended portion of the statute clearly does 
not confer a right that plaintiffs could assert against municipal 
defendants, because the fact that §2511(3)(a) prohibits a “person or 
entity” from unlawfully intercepting communications means that each 
word in § 2520 has meaning. In other words, § 2511(1)(c-d) does not 
create a cause of action against municipalities because Congress did 
not change the definition of the word “person” to include 
municipalities when it added the word “entity” to §2520. § 2511(3)(a) 
allows for suits against defendants other than persons, and the 
amendments that altered this provision also had to alter § 2520 to 
include the word entity, or an absurd result would have occurred.
188
 
 
B. Textualist Statutory Interpretation 
 
The majority opinion stated that the definition of entity excludes 
municipalities. In doing so, the majority gave proper deference to the 
doctrine that requires courts to give meaning to every word of the 
statute.
189
 Explained another way, the Seventh Circuit looked to the 
plain meaning of “person” and “entity” to resolve the ambiguity as to 
                                                 
187
 18 U.S.C. §2511(3)(a). 
188
 Seitz, 719 F.3d at 660 (“If ‘entity’ does not extend to government units, it 
adds nothing to the statute. And if we subject governmental units to suit for 
violations of §2511(1), we ignore the statute’s use of ‘person’ rather than ‘person or 
entity.’ Our interpretation avoids both of these pitfalls, giving due weight to the 
addition of ‘entity’ while remaining faithful to the plain text of §2511(1).”).  
189
 Id. at 658 (quoting Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., 519 U.S. 202, 209 
(1997): “We must give effect to each word when interpreting statutes”); see Damato 
v. Hermanson, 153 F.3d 464, 470 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Statutes must be interpreted, if 
possible, to give each word some operative effect.”).  
26
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whether municipalities are liable under the FWA amendments. A plain 
meaning approach is consistent with a textualist style of statutory 
interpretation. “Textualists argue that looking beyond the text raises 
constitutional concerns. Textualists ‘would hold Congress to the words 
it used…[T]o do otherwise would permit Congress to legislate without 
completing the required process for enactment of legislation.’”190 
Consistent with this doctrine, the court looked to the text of § 
2510(6) of the FWA.  §2510(6) defines the word person. It reads: “A 
person is “any employee, or agent of the United States or any State or 
political subdivision thereof, and any individual, partnership, 
association, joint stock company, trust, or corporation.”191 The 
definition of  “person” clearly excludes government units.  
Thus, the court aptly reasoned in Seitz, under the original 
composition of the statute in 1968, a plaintiff could sue “persons” but 
not municipalities, because the meaning of “persons” was inapplicable 
to municipalities.
192
  
The Seventh Circuit thus held to the credo that absent legislative 
intent to the contrary, statutory language must be regarded as 
comprehensive.
193
 In addition, courts should not only look to the 
particular statutory language at issues, but they should also look to the 
language and design of the statute as a whole.
194
 
The court’s method for interpreting “entity” is consistent with its 
textualist approach to resolving the statutory controversy in this case. 
Textualists look at the language of the statute at issue, the act as a 
whole, and the language of other statutes to communicate meaning.
195
 
In addition, textualists consult dictionaries to find the plain meaning of 
                                                 
190
 JELLUM & HRICIK, MODERN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 17 (quoting 
Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and History 
in Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM L. REV. 901, 951 (2000)). 
191
 18 U.S.C. § 2510(6).  
192
 Seitz, 719 F.3d at 656. 
193
 Amati v. City of Woodstock, 829 F. Supp. 998, 1001 (N.D. Ill. 1993) 
(quoting S. Rep. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in, 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2179). 
194
 See Seitz, 719 F.3d at 660. 
195
 JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 189, at 17. 
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the language at issue.
196
  Thus, here the court relied on the dictionary 
to define the word “entity.”197 An entity is: “An organization (such as a 
business or a governmental unit) that has a legal entity apart from its 
members or owners.”198 Thus, the court found that plaintiffs are right: 
“entity” reaches municipalities.199 If it did not, the 1986 amendments 
would not have contributed anything to the statute because the word 
“persons” already included organizations such as businesses.200 
Where the court disagreed with plaintiffs, however, and with the 
Sixth Circuit, is that just because the word “entity” includes 
government units does not mean it confers a right of action under 
§2520.
201
  Rather than cut its analysis short after determining that 
“entity” includes government entities, the court held the legislature to 
their words by recognizing the statute’s use of “person” in § 2511(1) 
rather than “person or entity.”202 
In Adams, the Sixth Circuit noted the legislature amended 
§2707(a) of the SCA when it amended §2520.
203
 The Senate 
Committee Report summarizing §2707 stated that the word entity 
includes governmental units.
204
 The Adams Court ended its analysis of 
legislative history to give meaning to the word entity here. But, its 
analysis is conclusory and ignores the statute’s use of “person” in § 
2511(1) rather than “person or entity.” The Seventh Circuit steered 
clear of this mistake by taking a textualist approach to the language of 
the FWA and “holding Congress to the words it used.”205   
 
 
                                                 
196
 Id. 
197
 Seitz, 719 F.3d at 657. 
198
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 269 (4th pocket ed. 2011). 
199
 Seitz, 719 F.3d at 657. 
200
 Id. 
201
 Id. 
202
 JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 189, at 20. 
203
 Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 985 (6th Cir. 2001). 
204
 Id.  
205
 JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 189, at 951. 
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C. Policy 
 
In an important footnote, the majority expressed concern that the 
court take care to determine, when asking whether someone may 
vindicate a particular statutory right, that the statute confers a right on 
identifiable persons, and whether that plaintiff is a member of that 
class of identifiable persons.
206
 Thus the majority, unlike the Sixth 
Circuit in Adams, was careful not to confer liability on municipalities 
contrary to Congress’s intent. To have held otherwise would have been 
tantamount to creating a problem in search of a solution. 
In his dissent in Adams, Judge Krupansky said “[i]n enacting the 
Wiretapping Act, Congress did not intend to prohibit all wiretapping or 
electronic monitoring.”207 Indeed, the preamble to the FWA states that 
the act’s purpose is “[t]o assist State and local government in reducing 
the incidence of crime, to increase the effectiveness, fairness, and 
coordination of law enforcement and criminal justice systems at all 
levels of government and for other purposes.”208 Congress recognized 
that reducing crime and protecting citizens from criminal behavior is a 
paramount social value. To achieve its goal, law enforcement must 
have an effective means of keeping pace with criminal activity, and 
wiretapping has proved to be an effective means of combatting 
crime.
209
 
On the other side of the debate, Justice Posner expressed concern 
for intrusions upon people’s privacy:  
 
In the absence of market discipline, there is no presumption 
that the government wills strike an appropriate balance 
between disclosure and confidentiality. And the enormous 
power of the government makes the potential consequences 
                                                 
206
 Seitz, 719 F.3d at n.4.  
207
 Adams, 250 F.3d at 993.  
208
 H.R. 5037, 90th Cong. (1968) (enacted).   
209
 Ayers, supra note 5, at 656.  
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of its snooping into people's private lives far more ominous 
than those of snooping by a private individual or firm.
210
  
 
 But, Judge Posner affirmed of the lower court’s dismissal of the 
suit against a municipality in Amati v. Woodstock.
211
 And, while 
Americans have expressed grave concern for their privacy in the 
modern technological age,
212
 courts have shown that they can uphold 
these interests while balancing the government’s interest in matters of 
public safety and security. For example, the Supreme Court rejected 
the administration’s use of wiretaps on Americans even during 
wartime.
213
 The court said: 
 
Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be guaranteed 
if domestic security surveillances may be conducted solely 
within the discretion of the Executive Branch. . . . The Fourth 
Amendment contemplates a prior judicial judgment, . . . [and] 
[t]his judicial role accords with our basic constitutional 
doctrine that individual freedoms will best be preserved 
through a separation of powers and division of functions 
among the difference branches and levels of Government. . . . 
We cannot accept the Government’s argument that internal 
security matters are too subtle and complex for judicial 
evaluation. Courts regularly deal with the most difficult 
issues of our society. . . Thus, we conclude that the 
Government's concerns do not justify departure in this case 
from the customary Fourth Amendment requirement of 
judicial approval prior to initiation of a search or 
surveillance.
214
 
                                                 
210
 Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme 
Court, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173, 176 (1979). 
211
 Ayers, supra note 5, at 688.   
212
 William J. Fenrich, Common Law Protection of Individual’s Rights in 
Personal Information, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 951, 962 (1996). 
213
 U.S. v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972). 
214
 Id. at 317-21. 
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Similarly, in his dissent in Nardone, Justice Sutherland stated: 
 
 I think the word ‘person’ used in this statute does not include an 
officer of the federal government, actually engaged in the 
detection of crime and the enforcement of the criminal statutes of 
the United States, who has good reason to believe that a telephone 
is being, or is about to be, used as an aid to the commission or 
concealment of a crime. The decision just made will necessarily 
have the effect of enabling the most depraved criminals to further 
their criminal plans over the telephone, in the secure knowledge 
that even if these plans involve kidnapping and murder, their 
telephone conversations can never be intercepted by officers of 
the law and revealed in court. If Congress thus intended to tie the 
hands of the government in its effort to protect the people against 
lawlessness of the most serious character, it would have said so in 
a more definite way than by the use of the ambiguous word 
‘person.’215  
Both of the aforementioned language from the Supreme Court are 
examples of a very important judicial policy: statutes should not be 
read to curtail government intrusion at the expense of the safety of the 
people unless it is Congress’s clear intent to enact such a law. 
Furthermore, Professor Robert Blakey testified before Congress in 
1967:  
 
So it is necessary to subject the known criminals to 
surveillance, that is, to monitor their activities. It is necessary 
to identify their criminal and noncriminal associates; it is 
necessary to identify their areas of operation, both legal and 
illegal. Strategic intelligence attempts to paint this broad, 
overall picture of the criminal's activities in order that an 
investigator can ultimately move in with a specific criminal 
investigation and prosecution.”216 To that end, “states 
                                                 
215
 Nardone v. U.S., 302 U.S. 379, 385 (1979). 
216
 Ayers, supra note 5, at 676. 
31
Prohov: Your Call Is Now Being Monitored: Should Municipalities Be Liable
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2013
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                             Volume 9, Issue 1                               Fall 2013 
 
231 
 
continue to posses the authority to safeguard the vital 
interests of the people.
217
 
 
It is fair to say that Americans are concerned about government 
inference with their private lives, particularly through interference 
with personal technological devices like cell phones and computers.
218
 
However, courts should take a balanced approach to upholding civil 
liberties and security interests. That the Seventh Circuit found cities 
are immune from suit under the FWA does not mean its decision is 
“cursory,” as the Sixth Circuit suggested; on the contrary, the court 
appropriately read meaning in every word of the statute and noted that 
legislative history did not impose liability on governmental units under 
§2520.  
It is important to note that the Seventh Circuit is not alone in its 
approach. The Supreme Court declined to bring municipalities within 
the ambit of potential liability when “neither the text nor the 
legislative history of the statute offered any support for doing so.”219  
For example, in Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of 
New York,
220
 a class of female employees of the Department of Social 
Services and of the Board of Education of the City of New York 
sought injunctive relief and backpay for unlawful forced maternity 
leaves.
221
 Like the Seventh Circuit in Seitz, the Court took note of the 
legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law that allows 
lawsuits for violations of constitutional rights.
222
 The Court analyzed 
four distinct stages of the bill that became the Civil Rights Act of 
1983
223
:  proposal, amendment, first conference report, and second 
conference report. The second conference report abandoned municipal 
                                                 
217
 See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n. v. Blasdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434 (1934). 
218
 Fenrich, supra note 212, at 962. 
219
 Seitz v. City of Elgin, 719 F.3d 654 n.3 (7th Cir. 2013).  
220
 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
221
 Id. at 660-61.  
222
 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
223
 Monell, 436 U.S at 665. 
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liability
224
 and made “any person or persons having knowledge [that a 
conspiracy to violate civil rights was afoot], and having power to 
prevent or aid in preventing the same,”225 liable to any person injured 
by the conspiracy.
226
 Section 1 of that bill is now codified as 42 U.S.C. 
1983.
227
   
After analyzing the four distinct stages of legislative history 
through the lens of the debate of the first conference committee, the 
Court concluded that municipalities and local government units are 
included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.
228
 However, 
like the Seventh Circuit, the Court analyzed the language of § 1983 
against the backdrop of the legislative history and declined to impose 
liability on municipalities directly or under a theory of vicarious 
liability.
229
§ 1983 provides: “Any person who, under color of any law, 
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall 
subject, or cause to be subjected, any person . . . to the deprivation of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the 
United States, shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage of the State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable 
to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress . . . .”230  
The Court reasoned that the plain language of the statute imposes 
liability on a government that causes an employee to violate another’s 
                                                 
224
 Id. at 668. 
225
 42 U.S.C. § 1986. 
226
 Monell, 436 U.S at 669. 
227
 Id. at 665. 
228
 Id. at 724 n.54. The Court notes there is no constitutional impediment to 
municipal liability. “The Tenth Amendment's reservation of non-delegated powers to 
the States is not implicated by a federal-court judgment enforcing the express 
prohibitions of unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment.” 
(quoting Miliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1977)). “Nor is there any basis for 
concluding that the Eleventh Amendment is a bar to municipal liability. See, e.g., 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 
529, 530 (1890).” Id.  
 
229
 Id. 
230
 Id.  
33
Prohov: Your Call Is Now Being Monitored: Should Municipalities Be Liable
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2013
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                             Volume 9, Issue 1                               Fall 2013 
 
233 
 
constitutional rights.
231
 Furthermore, that statute cannot be read to 
impose liability on a government vis-a vis its employee. 
232
 The fact 
that Congress did not write that a person is liable for another person’s 
tort when they caused that person to commit the tort against another 
suggests that Congress did not intend to bring municipalities within 
the ambit of liability absent such a cause. 
233
 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
In his dissent in Adams, Judge Krupansky said “[i]n enacting the 
Wiretapping Act, Congress did not intend to prohibit all wiretapping or 
electronic monitoring.”234 In declining to bring municipalities within 
the ambit of potential liability under the FWA unless through 
substantive provisions that identify an entity as a potential violator of 
that provision, the Seventh Circuit held Congress to the language it 
used in the Act and firmly upheld Congress’s policy to balance cities’ 
need to use surveillance as a protective measure against citizens’ right 
to privacy. While the Sixth Circuit found §2520 of the FWA alone 
subjects municipalities to suit,
235
 the statute plainly indicates it creates 
a substantive right against an “entity” elsewhere in the statute. As a 
result of the split between the Sixth and Seventh circuits on how the 
FWA applies to municipalities, this issue may yet reach the Supreme 
Court. 
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